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Judy K. Frels, Tasadduq Shervani, & Rajendra K. Srivastava 
The Integrated Networks Model: 
Explaining Resource Allocations in 
Network Markets 
The last decade has witnessed a shift from a focus on the value created by a single firm and product to an exam- 
ination of the value created by networks of firms (or product ecosystems) in which assets are comingled with exter- 
nal entities. The authors examine these market-based assets in the context of network markets and propose an 
Integrated Networks model in which three types of networks-user, complements, and producer-add value or 
enhance the attractiveness of the associated focal product. The authors empirically test the proposed model by sur- 
veying information technology professionals on their resource allocation decisions regarding the Unix and Windows 
NT operating systems. The findings suggest that the value added by these three networks is significantly and pos- 
itively associated with resources allocated by business customers to competing products. The results also show 
that the three networks mediate the relationship between stand-alone product performance and resource 
allocation. 
T 
he breakdown of vertical integration due to forces 
unleashed by globalization, technology, and the Inter- 
net has led to a dramatic shift in strategy toward vir- 
tual integration of businesses and formation of horizontal 
alliances to better serve customer requirements. Marketing 
and strategy researchers have begun to examine competitive 
advantages and value created by assets that arise from "the 
commingling of the firm with entities in its external envi- 
ronment" (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998, p. 2). 
These intangible assets, called "market-based assets," meet 
the definition of asset but exist outside of the firm. In a sim- 
ilar vein, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) describe mar- 
ket relationships as a "value net." Here, firms (competitors, 
distributors, complementors, and suppliers) and customers 
compose a game-theoretic co-opetitive1 environment of 
interdependencies within a market. Rindfleisch and Moor- 
man (2001) call such interdependencies between two com- 
petitors for the purpose of new product development "new 
product alliances;" Sivadas and Dwyer (2000) refer to it as 
I'Ray Noorda, former chief executive officer of Novell, is cred- 
ited with the term "co-opetition." Brandenburger and Nalebuff 
(1996) have taken it as the title of their book. The term describes 
environments in business that require firms to compete and coop- 
erate at the same time. 
Judy K. Frels is an assistant professor, R.H. Smith School of Business, 
University of Maryland. Tasadduq Shervani isa business consultant inFort 
Worth, Texas. Rajendra K. Srivastava is Jack R. Crosby Regent's Chair in 
Business Administration and Professor of Marketing and Management 
Science & Information Systems, Department of Marketing, McCombs 
School of Business, University of Texas at Austin. The authors thank the 
Center for Customer Insight at the University of Texas at Austin for funding 
the data collection in this study and Phoenix-based Applied Computer 
Research for supplying a mailing list. The authors gratefully acknowledge 
Thomas Burnham, Janet Wagner, and Brian Ratchford for their helpful 
comments on previous drafts. 
"cooperative competency." Others have labeled these 
market-based assets or networks "value webs" (Cartwright 
and Oliver 2000). Under these frameworks, a firm, its 
customer base, the makers of products and services comple- 
mentary to its own product, and even the offerings of its 
competitors are critical to assessing the strategic position of 
that firm. 
A central notion of market-based assets is that a cus- 
tomer's decision to adopt a product is often influenced by 
factors other than just the value inherent in the product itself. 
Chief among these market-based assets are networks of cus- 
tomers, channel members, and competitive suppliers. The 
firm's ability to leverage these networks can have a signifi- 
cant influence on the revenue and ultimate success of the 
firm because in many markets--called "network markets"- 
a significant portion of the utility of a product is created by 
the existence or expectations of networks surrounding the 
product (Besen and Farrell 1994). In this article, we further 
explicate the concept of market-based assets by combining 
it with work from diffusion (e.g., Bass 1969; Valente 1995), 
adoption (e.g., Heide and Weiss 1995), strategic alliances 
(e.g., Sivadas and Dwyer 2000), value nets and value webs 
(e.g., Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Cartwright and 
Oliver 2000), whole product concepts (e.g., Lambkin and 
Day 1989; McIntyre 1988; Moore 1999), and network exter- 
nalities (e.g., John, Weiss, and Dutta 1999; Katz and Shapiro 
1985). We propose and empirically test a model of a buyer's 
resource allocation decision on the basis of perceptions of 
these market-based assets or networks. 
A wide variety of markets meets the criteria for being 
classified as network markets. A network market exists if 
users derive benefits from the following: 
*The user network, or the extent to which the product is and 
is likely to be used pervasively within and outside the orga- 
nization. Buyers like to be assured that there is, or is likely to 
be, a significant pool of product users in addition to 
themselves. 
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*The complements network, or the number and variety of com- 
plementary products and services available. Buyers like to be 
assured that a variety of complements (e.g., hardware, soft- 
ware, services) are, or are likely to be, available in the future. 
*The producer network, or the number and degree of competi- 
tion among product vendors. Buyers do not like to be "single 
sourced" and prefer procurement situations with multiple 
qualified vendors. 
Information technology (IT) examples abound, and 
computer hardware/software and the fax machine are the 
most common. However, examples extend far into other 
contexts. The consumer entertainment market is replete with 
network markets such as those created by entertainment 
players and content (e.g., video home system [VHS], digital 
video disc [DVD], compact disc [CD]). Consumer video 
games are another example of a consumer network market 
in which the user network creates a large portion of the value 
of owning a box (keeping up with the Jones's children), and 
the quality of the complements network (games) drives the 
sale of the focal product. Other examples range from finan- 
cial services (in which a strong complements network 
makes the provider more attractive), to automobiles (which 
rely heavily on the complements network of service and fuel 
stations), to telephones (for which users only receive value 
when the user network develops), to diamond engagement 
rings (for which the value of such rings has grown largely 
because other users have validated the style; Conner 1995). 
Network markets are often described as "tippy," that is, 
that "the existence of incompatible products may be unsta- 
ble, with a single winning standard dominating the market" 
(Besen and Farrell 1994, p. 188; Arthur 1989; Valente 1995). 
Indeed, it has been argued in the literature that the value cre- 
ated by networks can be so great that inferior technologies 
(based purely on features, functionality, and technical per- 
formance characteristics) are able to push aside or hold off 
superior technologies. Cases such as the internal combustion 
engine versus the steam engine, VHS versus Beta, and Win- 
dows 95 versus OS/2 or Mac OS 7 are often cited as exam- 
ples in which inferior technologies won despite arriving on 
the scene later than a technologically superior incumbent. 
The purpose of this article is to enhance the understand- 
ing of market dynamics, value creation, and competitive 
advantage in network markets. Our thesis is that buyers allo- 
cate resources for the procurement of business assets (e.g., 
automobile fleets, IT, video systems) on the basis of a con- 
sideration of the stand-alone product performance as well as 
the user, complements, and producer networks. 
We have two key objectives in this research and two pri- 
mary areas of contribution to the marketing literature. First, 
we develop the Integrated Networks model, a conceptual 
framework of network markets, and define the three types of 
networks that are crucial to understanding how consumers 
allocate resources in network markets. Of the three networks 
in our model, previous marketing research focuses on the 
user network (e.g., Givon, Mahajan, and Muller 1995), the 
complements network (e.g., Bucklin and Sengupta 1993), or. 
the producer network (e.g., Kotabe, Sahay, and Aulakh 
1996). By including networks beyond the user network or 
installed base, we extend the current conceptualization of 
innovation diffusion, co-diffusion, adoption, and 
intraorganizational adoption (cf. Bass 1969; Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993; Kim and Srivastava 1998; Mahajan, Muller, 
and Bass 1990), showing that the complements and pro- 
ducer networks also play an important role. Furthermore, we 
propose that intraorganizational adoption is driven by the 
strength of each network, as measured by five characteris- 
tics: current size, expectations of future size, compatibility, 
accessibility, and quality. Previous research on user net- 
works focuses on the size of the network and expectations of 
the future size of the network (e.g., Economides and Him- 
melberg 1995). Our model's richer conceptualization of how 
networks create value extends previous work on networks 
(Martilla 1971; Valente 1995) and network externalities 
(Katz and Shapiro 1985) by providing more detail on the 
types of networks and the characteristics of networks that 
create utility and drive adoption in network markets. 
Our framework focuses not on the initial trial or first- 
time adoption of a product but on the extent to which a prod- 
uct is adopted by a customer and the ensuing commitment of 
new resources to buy additional units of the product over 
time. Many organizations have a policy of trying emerging 
technologies simply to be aware of options, but it is the 
extent to which a technology is embraced by an organiza- 
tion, the adoption intensity, and the corresponding commit- 
ment of new resources or buying additional units during a 
finite time period that ultimately lead to the success of the 
supplier firm. Therefore, our emphasis is on understanding 
how product performance and networks of users, comple- 
ments, and producers influence the intraorganizational dif- 
fusion of the innovation (Kim and Srivastava 1998). 
Our second objective and area of contribution is in our 
empirical test of the Integrated Networks model. Our empiri- 
cal study provides an early test of the market-based assets the- 
ory recently proposed by Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 
(1998, 1999) by measuring consumers' perceptions of these 
assets and examining their influence on the buyer's decision 
to purchase a firm's product. Furthermore, our study provides 
empirical evidence of the power of networks to influence pur- 
chase decisions and increases our confidence in research that 
draws on the concept of network externalities (e.g., Kotabe, 
Sahay, and Aulakh 1996; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 
1998; Valente 1995) by operationalizing, measuring, and 
empirically testing the Integrated Networks model as well as 
the network externalities framework nested within it. A dearth 
of empirical research in this area has prompted calls for 
empirical verification of network phenomena (John, Weiss, 
and Dutta 1999). By demonstrating that elements external to 
the focal product can drive its purchase, the framework pro- 
vides additional support for the concept of the "whole prod- 
uct" (Lambkin and Day 1989; Moore 1999) and the possibil- 
ity of market dominance by an inferior technology (Arthur 
1994; David 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). 
Although the concept of networks and network external- 
ities is well integrated into "street knowledge" and has been 
examined conceptually and analytically, little empirical 
work exists in this area (David and Greenstein 1990; John, 
Weiss, and Dutta 1999). Our article differs from the empiri- 
cal work that exists in four ways. 
First, in one study our research incorporates all three 
networks reported in marketing and economics literature to 
play a role in driving product selection. Prior empirical 
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research has examined either the user network (e.g., Econo- 
mides and Himmelberg 1995) or the complements network 
(e.g., Bayus 1987; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Gandal, 
Kende, and Rob 2000). We measure and test three networks 
simultaneously: user, complements, and producer. We find 
that each network plays a significant role in determining 
resource allocation, even in the presence of the other two 
networks. Furthermore, we expand the conceptualization of 
network characteristics that compose the relative strength of 
the network from two (size and expectations of future size) 
to five (size, expectations of future size, compatibility, 
accessibility, and quality). 
Second, we increase the validity of the findings in this 
area. Our research is based on actual perceptions of the pur- 
chaser, not on aggregate sales data. We survey purchasers 
regarding their perceptions of the three networks associated 
with a focal product and with a competing product as well as 
their perceptions of both products' technical capabilities and 
attributes. Previous research using aggregate data (e.g., 
Bayus 1987; Economides and Himmelberg 1995; Gandal, 
Kende, and Rob 2000) assumes that network effects are the 
"black box" between antecedent variables (such as comple- 
ments or user network size) and consequence variables (such 
as focal product diffusion or hedonic price) (Brynjolfsson 
and Kemerer 1996). Although previous research indicates, 
for example, that CD players' diffusion is positively associ- 
ated with the number of CD titles available, it does not indi- 
cate whether consumers perceive that a greater number of 
titles are available or whether the perception is tied to their 
adoption or resource allocation. No such assumption or leap 
is necessary in our study. We believe that by surveying con- 
sumers' perceptions directly, we greatly enhance the internal 
validity of the previous work that uses aggregate data and 
the external validity of the analytical work in this area. 
Third, we examine network effects in the context of a stan- 
dards battle: two products competing in a tippy market. Previ- 
ous empirical works (e.g., Bayus 1987; Economides and 
Himmelberg 1995) do not consider a competitive situation 
and the "winner takes all" nature of these markets (Arthur 
1989; Hill 1997). We not only examine perceived value of the 
focal product and its networks but also measure perceptions of 
the networks of the primary competing product to determine 
how the relative strength of the networks drives adoption, pro- 
viding insight into the competitive dynamics of a network 
market. This provides an empirical extension of previous ana- 
lytical efforts of network markets (e.g., Arthur 1989). 
Fourth, our dependent variable is not a price index that 
must then be interpreted as a proxy for utility or adoption 
(e.g., Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Gandal 1994, 1995). 
Thus, there is no need to make a leap from hedonic price to 
purchase. However, we do not examine only initial or first- 
time adoption. Instead, we measure intraorganizational 
adoption, or the amount of resources allocated by the pur- 
chaser to the focal and competing products on an ongoing 
basis. Continued purchase by an organization represents a 
larger portion of overall sales than does initial trial or adop- 
tion (Kim and Srivastava 1998). Therefore, it is more likely 
to be indicative of product success in a tippy market. 
Despite the large amount of analytical work in this area, 
there has been little empirical work, and none that we were 
able to find, that operationalizes all of the key variables and 
specifically measures consumers' perceptions of the net- 
works. Our study empirically validates the street knowledge 
in this area and significantly expands the existing scope of 
empirical study. 
In summary, we make several key contributions to the 
marketing literature. We offer a more comprehensive model 
of adoption in network markets, focusing on three networks 
that have not been examined previously in a single model. 
We provide a richer characterization of these networks than 
does preceding work in economics or marketing. We focus 
not on initial adoption but on intraorganization adoption, or 
the continued commitment of additional resources to a tech- 
nology-the source of much technology spending. We con- 
tribute empirical evidence on the power of networks by not 
only testing the Integrated Networks model but also provid- 
ing empirical support for market-based assets theory and 
network externality theory. 
The rest of this article is divided into four sections. The 
next section examines the role of stand-alone product per- 
formance and user, complements, and producer networks in 
influencing the extent to which technologies competing for 
organizational resources (share of purchases, budgets) are 
embraced by organizations. The second section details 
methodological issues. In the third section, we discuss our 
results, and in the fourth section, we examine the contribu- 
tions and limitations of the findings. 
Network Markets and Resource 
Allocation 
Economists and marketers both make extensive use of the 
term "network." In marketing research, the term has come to 
have many meanings such as business or social networks 
(Iacobucci 1996; Valente 1995), but put most simply, mar- 
keters consider networks phenomena that describe intercon- 
nections among people or organizations.2 
Economists arrive at a similar meaning, albeit by a dif- 
ferent path. Although they originally used the term "net- 
work" in "network externalities" to refer to benefits that 
accrue from connections of physical networks such as tele- 
phones or railway lines, the term was extended to include 
value created by networks of users sharing compatible prod- 
ucts or standards. 
Figure 1 shows the four key constructs in the Integrated 
Networks model that drive resource allocation: stand-alone 
product performance, the user network, the complements 
network, and the producer network. We describe these 
subsequently. 
Stand-Alone Product Performance 
Fundamental to the notion of selecting one product over 
another is the utility delivered by the product itself, inde- 
pendent of the value delivered by any network. Product per- 
formance3 is based on the features and attributes of the tech- 
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for this concise definition. 
3For the purpose of brevity and readability, the term "product per- 
formance" is interchanged for "stand-alone product performance." 
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FIGURE 1 
The Integrated Networks Model 
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nology as it stands alone, not utility delivered by the prod- 
uct's rate of diffusion, the complements, or other market- 
based assets that add value to the product. It is this element 
of utility that is considered when discussion of inferior prod- 
ucts arises-the core technological value of the product 
itself without external factors considered. 
The User Network 
In network externality theory, the size of the user network is 
the key driving factor behind adoption decisions (Katz and 
Shapiro 1985). Both in individual consumer settings and in 
organizational adoption decisions, a network of previous 
adopters is believed to encourage adoption among non- 
adopters by making the product more useful, providing 
opportunities for word of mouth and observation, or sending 
a quality signal (Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Hellofs and 
Jacobson 1999; Martilla 1971; Rogers 1995; Valente 1995). 
The influence of the user network is incorporated in 
most technology diffusion models through the coefficient of 
imitation or internal influence in marketing's diffusion 
research (Bass 1969). Early research on networks of innova- 
tors describes the ways that technical information and know- 
how are transferred among social networks of buyers and 
potential buyers (e.g., Czepiel 1975; Martilla 1971). Czepiel 
(1975) finds that communication channels link technical 
decision makers in rival firms for the purpose of information 
acquisition, validation, and verification. These networks of 
innovators can include not only those making resource allo- 
cation decisions but also the firms producing the product, 
exchanging information with buyers to enhance the innova- 
tion and thus increase adoption of that innovation (Hikans- 
son 1987; Von Hippel 1988). 
Research on market-based assets suggests that the utility 
delivered by an established installed base can lead to faster 
market acceptance of a product, not only through word-of- 
mouth effects but also by lending an air of credibility to the 
organization (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). This 
accelerates cash flows, thus increasing shareholder value 
and strengthening the competitive position of the innovating 
firm. The positive effect of a user network can be so strong 
and thus important to a product's ultimate success that it 
may be worthwhile to tolerate some degree of piracy to grow 
the user base and develop the network externality benefits 
(Conner and Rumelt 1991; Givon, Mahajan, and Muller 
1995). 
What is it about the user network that influences adop- 
tion? In network externalities theory, economists state that 
both current size and expectations about future size enhance 
the strength of a user network (Besen and Farrell 1994; Katz 
and Shapiro 1985). In turn, a strong user network increases 
a product's value and, therefore, the resources it attracts and 
its likelihood of purchase, which creates a positive feedback 
loop. On the basis of previous research in marketing and 
strategy, we consider the following additional characteristics 
that add to the strength of a network: compatibility, accessi- 
bility, and quality. 
*Compatibility in the user network refers to users either inside 
or outside the firm who are important to the potential buyer or 
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user for reasons such as opinion leadership or compatibility 
(Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Rogers 1995). 
*The degree to which the user network is accessible to a poten- 
tial adopter (verbally, visually, or electronically) can deter- 
mine the influence the user network can have on that adopter 
(Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Valente 1995). Accessibility 
is similar to Rogers's (1995) concept of the observability of 
the adoption and its influence on other members of the social 
system. 
*Although the quality of the technology itself is captured in the 
product performance, the quality of a network refers to the 
technological expertise, innovativeness, oundness, reliability, 
and reputation of users who have adopted the technology. The 
quality of the members of the user network can influence 
potential adopters and future resource allocation by exacting 
a normative influence on the potential adopter through opin- 
ion leadership (Gatignon and Robertson 1985; Valente 1995), 
by signaling identification (Conner 1995; Solomon 1983), or 
in a business setting, through mimetic isomorphism (DiMag- 
gio and Powell 1983).4 
Together with current size and expectations of future 
size, these three characteristics compose a second-order or 
higher-order factor that we call the strength of the network. 
When these characteristics are measured in comparison with 
a competing set of networks, we call it the relative strength 
of the network. These characteristics help enhance the util- 
ity a user derives from the networks and thus influence the 
choice of product or technology in network markets. 
H 1: The greater the strength of the user network, the greater are 
the resources allocated to that product. 
Complements Network 
The complements network is composed of products and ser- 
vices that are needed to make the focal product more pro- 
ductive or complete as part of a whole solution. The whole 
product (also referred to as a product ecosystem or customer 
solution) includes not only the focal product but also addi- 
tional hardware and software, training, support, or other ele- 
ments needed to create a "compelling reason to buy" (Moore 
1999, p. 115). In technological innovations, the whole prod- 
uct is essential to convince users other than technology 
experts to purchase, or to "cross the chasm" (Moore 1999, p. 
7). Marketing researchers have called elements that com- 
pose this whole product the industry or product infrastruc- 
ture (Lambkin and Day 1989; McIntyre 1988). 
Just as members of the user network are linked by their 
purchase of a common standard for a focal product, mem- 
bers of the complements network are linked by their com- 
patibility with the focal product. Complement makers such 
as game developers for Nintendo are connected in that they 
compete for a limited number of game licenses allocated 
each year for a platform that is attractive because it is so 
widely diffused (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). The 
greater the number of complementary products (e.g., inter- 
active games), the greater is the usefulness of the focal prod- 
uct (e.g., Nintendo or Sega game console). In addition, dis- 
tributors of the focal product (providing the complementary 
service of distribution) are linked by the interdependencies 
between inventories of focal and complementary products. 
Similar to the user network, we propose that the strength 
of the complements network drives resource allocation and 
that the strength of the complements network can similarly 
be characterized by its current size, expectations of future 
size, compatibility, accessibility, and quality. The comple- 
ments network is more compatible with the user when it 
contains elements that are needed to provide backward com- 
patibility with previous systems or interoperability with 
other users that are critical to the buyer's intended use of the 
focal product. Complements (such as Universal Product 
Code [UPC] labels and CDs) must also be accessible before 
the focal product (UPC scanners and CD players, respec- 
tively) can successfully diffuse (Bayus 1987; Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993; Sengupta 1998). The quality of the comple- 
ments network can play a large role in resources allocated to 
the focal product. Lotus 1-2-3, faster and more powerful 
than its then-competitors, VisiCalc or Multiplan, became the 
"killer app" for the original IBM personal computer (PC), 
significantly influencing IBM's emergence as the desktop 
computing standard in the business segment (Carlton 1997). 
The diffusion and intraorganizational adoption of the 
focal product may be directly tied to the diffusion rate of 
complementary products. Researchers point out the impor- 
tance of thinking beyond the firm's own borders. Bucklin 
and Sengupta (1993, p. 159) posit that "Product strategies 
based solely upon the expansion of 'own' demand where 
complementarities exist may be suboptimal." If developed 
properly (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001; Sivadas and 
Dwyer 2000), relationships with these complement 
providers can become an attractive market-based asset and 
instrumental in the success of the focal product (Srivastava, 
Shervani, and Fahey 1998). Thus, we include the comple- 
ments network as a key element of our model. 
H2: The greater the strength of the complements network, the 
greater are the resources allocated to that product. 
Producer Network 
The producer network is composed of manufacturers that 
produce products that are functionally equivalent to and 
compatible with the focal product. Thus, this network 
includes the original product producer and any other com- 
petitive manufacturers that, through licensing or other 
means, have been able to produce functionally equivalent, 
compatible products. These products may be imitations, 
clones, or generics. The co-opetitive role of additional prod- 
uct producers can be critical to the ultimate success of the 
focal firm's product (Kotabe, Sahay, and Aulakh 1996). 
Similar to the complements network, the growth of the 
producer network can have a positive effect on product 
adoption, relative to that of competing product ecosystems. 
As more entrants compete within a single standard, price 
reductions may result, increasing the size of the potential 
market. Increased competition may lead to higher levels of 
distribution and promotional activity, which in turn can 
accelerate diffusion of the product (Kim, Bridges, and Sri- 
vastava 1999). The addition of clones to the IBM- 
4DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 149) describe isomorphism as 
a "constraining process that forces one unit in a population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental con- 
ditions." Mimetic isomorphism occurs when firms become more 
similar through imitation, typically under conditions of uncer- 
tainty. 
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compatible PC camp not only drove prices and margins 
down but also drew customers away from Apple's Macin- 
tosh. Cloners may have more experience with, knowledge 
of, and capabilities for serving different markets (geo- 
graphic or otherwise), bringing expertise and access to mar- 
kets that the innovator cannot serve well (Conner 1995; 
Robertson 1993). Furthermore, the existence of multiple 
producers provides a second source to the customer, which 
prevents the innovating firm from price gouging the user at 
a later time, and therefore reduces the user's risk in commit- 
ting to a product (Farrell and Gallini 1988). 
The network characteristics that make the user and com- 
plements network valuable also describe the strength of the 
producer network. As discussed previously, current size and 
future size of the network influence utility. The producer 
network is compatible with the user if the user has an estab- 
lished, ongoing relationship with its members. A producer 
network that is not compatible with the user can lead to 
vendor-related switching costs (Heide and Weiss 1995) as 
well as losses of utility associated with the termination of 
existing vendor relationships (Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
Research in channels and distribution emphasizes the acces- 
sibility of producers (Magrath and Hardy 1991; Stern and 
El-Ansary 1992). Different product producers may be 
invited into the producer network specifically because they 
are accessible to a particular group of users (Conner 1995). 
Quality and reputation of the members of the producer net- 
work contribute to the firm's performance by influencing the 
likelihood of focal product adoption (Fombrun 1996; Rao 
1994). 
Developing the producer network is not without risk to 
the innovator. Under different appropriability regimes,5 the 
innovator may or may not be able to control the develop- 
ment of the producer network. Also, depending on the 
appropriability regime, the innovator may or may not profit 
from the producer network's growth. In addition, the types 
of competitors that enter and are successful at different 
points in the product evolution will vary (Lambkin and Day 
1989). However, it is expected that in most cases, the diffu- 
sion of the focal product will increase with a more devel- 
oped producer network (Lambkin and Day 1989). Conse- 
quently, we hypothesize the following: 
H3: The greater the strength of the producer network, the 
greater are the resources allocated to that product. 
The Relationship Between Networks and Stand- 
Alone Product Performance 
The Integrated Networks model provides insight not only in 
understanding adoption and intraorganizational penetration 
in network markets but also into the relationship between 
the networks and stand-alone product performance in creat- 
ing value for the user. Networks are unlikely to develop 
around a product that is deemed unsatisfactory and unlikely 
to provide some degree of value for the consumer. There- 
fore, it is reasonable to conclude that stand-alone product 
performance-value delivered by the technology, indepen- 
dent of the networks-will influence the development of the 
networks. However, it has also been proposed that after the 
networks have begun to develop and deliver value, that value 
can overwhelm the value uniquely created by the product 
itself. Technological standards battles studied in previous 
research include the QWERTY keyboard versus the Dvorak 
keyboard (David 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis 1990, 
1999), the VHS and Betamax contest (Arthur 1994; 
Liebowitz and Margolis 1995), and the competition between 
internal combustion and steam engines (Arthur 1989). The 
relationship between product performance and the networks 
suggests a mediation scenario, with the networks mediating 
between the stand-alone product performance and resource 
allocation. Thus, strongly networked products that are based 
on lesser technological solutions are often adopted over 
superior but weakly networked products because, we pro- 
pose, networks mediate the relationship between product 
performance and resource allocation decisions. 
H4: The user network mediates the relationship between stand- 
alone product performance and the resources allocated to 
the product. 
Hs: The complements network mediates the relationship 
between stand-alone product performance and the 
resources allocated to the product. 
H6: The producer network mediates the relationship between 
stand-alone product performance and the resources allo- 
cated to the product. 
Methodology 
We first describe our instrument and data collection proce- 
dures. Next, we assess the reliability of the measures and the 
discriminant and convergent validity of our constructs. We 
then examine the association of the networks with resource 
allocation and the ability of networks to mediate the rela- 
tionship between product performance and resource 
allocation. 
Context 
The context for this study is a network market. We chose to 
examine a purchase decision made by IT professionals 
regarding a high-technology product. We surveyed IT pro- 
fessionals at major U.S. firms choosing between the Win- 
dows NT and Unix operating systems. We chose this context 
because operating system choice is typically a sufficiently 
significant purchase that IT professionals are likely to con- 
sider multiple attributes of the available choices. Also, IT 
professionals have detailed knowledge of the competing 
products and are able to assess the stand-alone technical 
product characteristics and performance (i.e., the value 
delivered by the technology, separate from the networks). In 
addition, research in technology markets has focused on 
similar key informants at the organization level (Gatignon 
and Robertson 1989; Heide and Weiss 1995; Weiss and 
Heide 1993). 
5Teece (1986, p. 287) defines the appropriability regime as the 
"environmental factors, excluding firm and market structure, that 
govern an innovator's ability to capture the profits generated by an 
innovation." These include factors such as intellectual property, 
whether the innovation is incorporated in a product or in a process, 
and whether the innovation involves tacit versus codified knowl- 
edge. 
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Because we examine a competitive standards battle, we 
focus on the relative strength of the networks and collect a 
comparative assessment of the stand-alone product perfor- 
mance. Network markets are tippy markets, and competition 
in such markets is appropriately analyzed by methodology 
that recognizes the interdependencies between competing 
products' diffusion processes (e.g., Arthur 1989). 
Instrument 
We developed a questionnaire that was targeted at IT pro- 
fessionals and pertained to their resource allocation deci- 
sions in situations in which Windows NT and Unix were 
both technically feasible options. The survey was initially 
pretested by three IT professionals at a large university. We 
modified the survey on the basis of their feedback and sub- 
mitted it to a sample consisting of 25 IT professionals 
enrolled in an executive education class. We checked initial 
scale reliability and modified the survey again, on the basis 
of reliability measures and comments (written and verbal) 
from this group. The revised survey was then pretested by 
three IT professionals at a Fortune-500 company, and we 
made changes on the basis of their in-depth feedback. We 
then administered the survey to the sample described next. 
Sample and Data Collection 
The sample consisted of 3000 senior computing executives at 
large firms in the United States. The names were randomly 
selected from a list of 5000 top computing executives, pro- 
vided by Phoenix-based Applied Computer Research. These 
firms belong to the Fortune 1000, Forbes 500, or Informa- 
tion Week 500 or they met at least one of the following criteria: 
*They owned a mid-size or mainframe computer (an IBM 308x 
or larger, an Amdahl, or Hitachi); 
*They had 50 or more IT employees; 
*They had an IT budget of $4 million or more; 
*They owned 200 or more PCs; or 
*They owned one of the following types of systems: CDC, Tan- 
dem, Cray, Unisys A series, or DEC VAX 7000. 
These constraints reduced the likelihood of surveying IT 
professionals who manage only desktop PCs in which Unix 
is less likely to be a feasible or realistic choice. 
The instrument, a letter requesting the user's assistance, 
and an offer for a summary of the results were included, 
along with a business-reply return envelope. Approximately 
four weeks after the initial survey was mailed, a reminder 
postcard was sent. Of the 265 completed surveys, 237 were 
usable. A total of 65 other surveys were returned as undeliv- 
erable or because the addressee was no longer employed at 
the firm. This represented a response rate of 9%. Although 
this represents below average survey response rates of top 
management (Menon, Bharadwaj, and Howell 1996), this is 
not inconsistent with studies of similar target samples (Peet 
1998; Vedder et al. 1999). Adequately powered t-tests 
(Cohen 1988) of means of key variables (network character- 
istics, product performance, and resource allocation) show 
no significant differences between those who responded 
before (n = 194) versus those who responded after (n = 43) 
the reminder postcard. 
Measures 
One goal of this research is to significantly extend the 
empirical effort in network market research by providing the 
first empirical measurement of consumers' perceptions of 
network externalities as well as of our proposed Integrated 
Networks model. Our measures are not proxies for network 
externalities, nor is our model based on aggregate data. We 
survey consumers on the current size of the user and com- 
plements networks and the expectations of the future size of 
the user and complements networks, as well as the newly 
introduced characteristics of each of the three networks: 
compatibility, accessibility, and quality. Although the mea- 
sures we develop are specific to our context, operating sys- 
tems, we believe they can provide guidance for future 
researchers in network markets. 
Specific Decision Area 
The first question of the survey was highlighted in a section 
titled "Your Specific Decision: What Decision Are You 
Making Today?" and asked the respondent to consider a 
recent or upcoming decision. The respondent was asked to 
select from a list or to write in the functional area of that 
decision (e.g., CAD/CAM operations, accounting, engineer- 
ing, design use). Respondents were told that this was their 
specific decision area and were asked to answer all ques- 
tions with respect to that decision context. Included in 
nearly every item are the words "specific decision area" to 
help ensure that the respondent reported on the networks 
affiliated with the operating system and the attributes of the 
operating system itself in that specific context. We did this 
to encourage a consistent perspective by the user as he or 
she responded to the survey and to avoid an aggregation bias 
across decisions made in a particular year. 
Resource Allocation 
We asked the user to estimate the percentage of the operat- 
ing system/application/workstation budget that was to be 
spent on Windows NT-based services and goods and Unix- 
based services and goods in 1998. Again, we instructed the 
user to focus on the specific decision area he or she had indi- 
cated at the beginning of the survey. We used the percentage 
of this budget to be spent on Unix as the dependent variable. 
Because it is a percentage bound by 0 and 1, we replaced 
responses of 0 or 1 with near approximations (Cohen and 
Cohen 1983), and we performed a logit transformation. The 
transformed variable ranges from -5.29 to 5.29 with a mean 
of -.85 and a standard deviation of 2.26. Skewness is -.15, 
and kurtosis is -.01. 
Assessment of Stand-Alone Product Performance 
Stand-alone product performance measures the user's per- 
ception of the Unix and Windows NT operating systems as 
independent technological products, separate from the net- 
works surrounding these products. We asked the users to 
assess the importance within their specific decision area of 
ten technical operating system attributes using a five-point 
response scale ranging from "not at all important" to "very 
important." The attributes can be grouped into three general 
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categories: complex computing capabilities of the operating 
system (e.g., multiprocessor support, scalability, clustering, 
high performance features), manageability of the operating 
system (e.g., ease of recovery from crashes, security, ease of 
manageability, networking), and robustness of the operating 
system (e.g., robustness/stability, maturity). The list of 
attributes was developed from an extensive search of techni- 
cal publications pertaining to operating systems (e.g., Byte 
1996; Edge: Work-Group Computing Report 1996; Informa- 
tion Week 1997) and was pretested by IT professionals. After 
users rated the importance of each attribute, we asked them 
to rate each operating system's performance on a scale of 1 
to 5, ranging from "does not provide this capability at all" to 
"provides this capability very well." 
For eight of the ten attributes, Unix was rated signifi- 
cantly higher than NT (NT was rated higher on "ease of 
manageability" and "networking"). To avoid multicollinear- 
ity problems in subsequent analyses, we collapsed ratings 
into one item that represented stand-alone product perfor- 
mance. We computed this item by taking the Unix rating, 
subtracting the NT rating, and multiplying the result by the 
importance score.6 Thus, this is a relative scale in which a 
large positive number indicates a belief that Unix is the 
superior operating system and a large negative number indi- 
cates a belief that NT is the superior operating system. This 
value has a mean of 19.13, standard error of 3.75, skewness 
of -1.15, and kurtosis of 2.93. 
Perceptions of the Three Networks 
We measured each characteristic of each network using a 
multi-item scale. The items consist of statements such as 
"This operating system has a sizable market share today in 
my specific decision area" and are followed by two five- 
point scales, one for NT and one for Unix, anchored by 
"strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." We did not include 
the current size of the producer network and the expecta- 
tions about the future size of the producer network in the 
instrument. Pretests showed that questions related to size of 
the producer network cause confusion among users. Idio- 
syncratic to this industry, each operating system, regardless 
of its standard interfaces and alliances, is developed by a 
single firm; therefore, we did not measure current size and 
expectations of future size of the producer network in the 
survey. We subsequently discuss scale refinement proce- 
dures (final scales are provided in Appendix A). 
Control Variables 
Previous research in adoption has found other variables to 
be associated with resource allocation decisions. Because 
they are not the central focus of our framework, they are 
included in our analysis as control variables. The first cate- 
gory of control variables is associated with cost and includes 
cost of heterogeneity (owning more than one operating sys- 
tem), total cost of ownership of the operating system 
(Rogers 1995; Weiss 1994), concern for compatibility 
(Weiss and Heide 1993), and the financial switching costs 
associated with switching from one operating system to 
another (Burnham, Frels, and Mahajan 2003; Weiss 1994). 
The second category is associated with the firm's decision- 
making process. These include the firm's risk aversion 
(Puto, Patton, and King 1985; Tellis and Gaeth 1990) and 
innovativeness, measured as organizational centrality 
(Gatignon and Robertson 1989; Mansfield 1968). Final 
scale items are provided in Appendix B. 
Scale Refinement and Analysis 
To obtain a measure of the relative strength of one network 
over the competing network, we followed the subsequent 
procedure. For each item that measured a network charac- 
teristic, we subtracted the response given for NT from the 
response given for Unix, creating a relative scale in which a 
positive number indicates a belief that the Unix operating 
system scores higher on that particular item and a negative 
number indicates a belief that NT scores higher on that par- 
ticular item. Peter, Churchill, and Brown (1993) warn 
against potential problems with the use of such difference 
scores: understated or overstated reliability, spurious corre- 
lations, and discriminant validity. In Appendix A, we show 
the reliabilities of the component measures (measures for 
each individual operating system) as well as the combined 
scores (calculated as proscribed by Peter, Churchill, and 
Brown 1993), all but one of which are at or above the .70 
recommendation provided by Nunnally and Bernstein 
(1996). The exception is accessibility of the user network in 
which reliability is .66. Thus, we do not face the reliability 
issues Peter, Churchill, and Brown caution against. Because 
the individual measures that make up the difference score 
(the component measures) are not included in further analy- 
sis, Peter, Churchill, and Brown's concerns regarding spuri- 
ous correlations or discriminant validity are also not applic- 
able. Peter, Churchill, and Brown also discuss a variance 
restriction problem that is not applicable in these measures 
because the measures do not have a "more is always better" 
connotation. 
The survey contained 71 items that measured the net- 
work constructs. We submitted these items to the iterative 
purification process recommended by Churchill (1979), 
Gerbing and Anderson (1988), and Bollen (1989), consist- 
ing of exploratory factor analysis, reliability analysis, and 
confirmatory factor analysis. This process led us to retain a 
total of 42 items, which are provided in Appendix A. Con- 
firmatory factor analyses (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) 
show that the measurement models fit the data well (normed 
fit index [NFI] and comparative fit index [CFI] > .90; see 
details in Appendix C). We checked the characteristics of 
each network for discriminant validity to assess the unique- 
ness of each characteristic by setting the correlation of each 
pair of two measures to 1.0 within the measurement model 
and checking the degradation of the X2 measure (Anderson 
and Gerbing 1988). We also tested unidimensionality and 
convergent validity of each construct according to proce- 
dures recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). For 
6We conducted regression analyses that included the operating 
system ratings without this arithmetic manipulation. We compared 
these with similar analyses that included the collapsed measure. 
The two yielded similar adjusted R2 figures and similar signifi- 
cance for other variables in the equation, but we could not interpret 
the signs and significance of the operating system attribute ratings 
because of high multicollinearity among these items. 
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the control variable measures, we used scale purification 
processes similar to those used for the network characteris- 
tics. Fit indices are provided in Appendix B. 
For 8 of the 13 network characteristics measured, NT 
was rated as having a stronger network than Unix, whereas 
Unix's networks were rated stronger in only two cases: qual- 
ity of the producer network and quality of the complements 
network. There was no significant difference between the 
products in the size of their user networks, the quality of 
their user networks, or the compatibility of their comple- 
ments network. 
Finally, we explored the existence of second-order fac- 
tors of "relative strength of network" following methods 
outlined by Gerbing and Anderson (1984), Bollen (1989), 
Marsh (1987), and Rindskopf and Rose (1988). We found 
that three second-order factors fit the data better than the 
first-order factors on many measures and only marginally 
worse than the first-order factors on a few measures. On the 
basis of recommendations by Marsh (1987) and Rindskopf 
and Rose (1988), we use the second-order factors on the 
basis of their fit with the data, their theoretical attractive- 
ness, and their parsimony (see Appendix C). Discriminant 
validity tests (Anderson and Gerbing 1988) conducted on 
the second-order factors show that the three second-order 
strength constructs are distinct from one another. Correla- 
tion coefficients among all variables are shown in Table 1. 
We tested five structural models using AMOS 4.01 
(Arbuckle and Wothke 1999). Model 1 is the full model as 
is shown conceptually in Figure 1 (for clarity, Figure 1 does 
not include the first-order factors, indicators, error terms, or 
control variables).7 To test for mediation, we followed pro- 
cedures described by Baron and Kenny (1986). Model 2 
regresses resource allocation on stand-alone product perfor- 
mance, excluding the mediators from the model (Path C in 
Barron and Kenny [1986]). Models 3, 4, and 5 each regress 
one of the mediating networks on the stand-alone product 
performance (Path A in Barron and Kenny [1986]). In Mod- 
els 1 and 2, in which resource allocation is the dependent 
variable, the six control variables are included in the model 
with single-item indicators and the error variances set to (1 - 
variance) x reliability (Jtireskog and Sorbom 1989, p. 153). 
Results 
We present the results in Table 2. Model 1, the full model, 
shows support for H1, H2, and H3. In testing H1, we show 
that the relative strength of the user network is positively 
associated with the resources allocated to Unix (P = .32; p < 
.001). In support of H2, we find that the complements net- 
work is significantly and positively associated with resource 
allocation (p = .21, p < .01). In support of H3, we find that 
the producer network is significantly and positively associ- 
ated with resource allocation (1 = .34, p = .001). No control 
variables are significant in Model 1. Thus, we find support 
for H1, H2 and H3. 
Testing H4-H6 requires information from Models 1-5. 
First, we examine Model 2 to determine if the stand-alone 
product performance is indeed positively associated with 
resource allocation when the mediators (networks) are not 
present. Model 2 shows that this is indeed the case (P3 = .47; 
p < .001.) Second, we examine Models 3-5 and find that the 
networks (the mediators) are indeed positively associated 
with the stand-alone product performance: Product perfor- 
mance -> user network, 3 = .63, p < .001; product perfor- 
mance -> complements network, 1 = .57, p < .001; product 
performance -- producer network, 1 = .62, p < .001. Finally, 
we examine the size and significance of the relationship 
between product performance and resource allocation in 
Models 1 and 2. Although this relationship is significant 
when the mediators are absent (Model 2), it is not significant 
in the model that includes the mediators (Model 1): Product 
performance - resource allocation, f = -.04, p = .74. Thus, 
the three requirements for mediation are met, and we find 
support for H4-H6. 
The only control variable that is significant in either Model 
1 or Model 2 is "cost of heterogeneity," which is significantly 
and negatively associated with resource allocation (1 = -.18, 
p < .05) in Model 2, indicating that as the perceived cost of 
owning multiple operating systems increases, the resources to 
be allocated to Unix decrease. This is reasonable given the 
encroachment of NT into Unix markets during the 1998 time 
frame and resource constraints related to IT infrastructure. 
7Hess's (2000) paper on unidentified recursive models is not a 
factor in our model, as we have no correlated error terms. 
TABLE 1 
Correlation Coefficients Among Independent, Dependent, and Control Variables 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 
Relative strength of user network (X1) 1.00 
Relative strength of complements network (X2) .80* 1.00 
Relative strength of producer network (X3) .67* .71* 1.00 
Stand-alone product performance (X4) .58* .61" .55* 1.00 
Concern for compatibility (X5) -.05 -.03 -.03 -.12 1.00 
Risk aversion (X6) .06 .07 .05 .08 .00 1.00 
Innovativeness (X7) -.12 -.12 -.07 -.08 .04 -.12 1.00 
Cost of heterogeneity (X8) -.35* -.37* -.30" -.37* .23* -.12 .12 1.00 
Relative total cost of ownership (X9) -.08 -.08 -.07 .09 .00 .05 .07 .11 1.00 
Financial switching costs (X10) .04 .05 .00 .05 
-.15" .12 .01 -.21" -.08 1.00 
Percentage of resources allocated to Unix (X11) .65* .60* .57* .49* -.02 -.02 -.07 -.32* -.03 .02 1.00 
*Significant at least at the level of p < .05. 
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TABLE 
2 
Relationship 
of 
Networks 
and 
Stand-Alone 
Product 
Performance 
to 
Resource 
Allocationt 
Model 
2 
Product 
Models 
3, 
4, 
and 
5 
Model 
1 
Performance 
Resource 
Product 
Performance 
-- 
Structural 
Path 
Hypothesis 
Full 
Model 
Allocation 
Network 
Mediator 
Relative 
strength 
of 
user 
network 
-> 
resource 
allocation 
H1 
.32*** 
Relative 
strength 
of 
complements 
network 
- 
resource 
allocation 
H2 
.21** 
Relative 
strength 
of 
producer 
network 
- 
resource 
allocation 
H3 
.34*** 
Product 
performance 
- 
resource 
allocation 
H4, 
Hs, 
H6 
-.04 
.47*** 
Product 
performance 
-- 
relative 
strength 
of 
user 
network 
H4 
.64*** 
.63*** 
Product 
performance 
-- 
relative 
strength 
of 
complements 
network 
H5 
.58 ** 
.57** 
Product 
performance 
-+ 
relative 
strength 
of 
producer 
network 
H6 
.62 ** 
.62*** 
Control 
Variables 
Concern 
for 
compatibility 
-- 
resource 
allocation 
.04 
.08 
Risk 
aversion 
-- 
resource 
allocation 
-.05 
-.02 
In ovativeness 
-- 
resource 
allocation 
.05 
.03 
Cost 
of 
heterogeneity 
-> 
resource 
allocation 
-.09 
-.18" 
Relativ  
total 
cost 
of 
ownership 
-4 
resource 
allocation 
.09 
.03 
Financial 
switching 
costs 
-+ 
resource 
allocation 
.02 
.01 
Squared 
multiple 
correlation 
of 
resource 
allocation 
.43 
.26 
X2 
2603.42 
85.25 
d grees 
of 
freedom 
(d.f.) 
1157 
21 
CFI 
.89 
.98 
NFI 
.82 
.98 
Root 
mean 
square 
error 
of 
approximation 
.07 
.11 
*p 
< 
= 
.05. 
**p 
< 
= 
.01. 
***p 
<= 
.001. 
tStandardized 
path 
coefficients. 
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Discussion 
Findings 
In recent years, new theory regarding network markets has 
been advanced (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998, 
1999) simultaneously with a call for more empirical 
research in this area (John, Weiss, and Dutta 1999). Our 
research extends the theoretical development of market-base 
assets and networks and provides empirical evidence on the 
influence of such networks on intraorganizational adoption 
decisions. In this study, we operationalize and test our con- 
ceptual framework, the Integrated Networks model, that 
explains intraorganizational diffusion and continued 
resource allocation in network markets. Although many 
markets are network markets, in this study we test our 
model in the operating system marketplace. The results 
show that networks can be characterized by five dimen- 
sions-size, expectations of future size, compatibility, 
accessibility, and quality-that can be represented by a 
higher-order factor of network strength. We find that each of 
the three networks-user, complements, and producer-is 
positively and significantly associated with resource 
allocation. 
Furthermore, we find that the networks mediate the rela- 
tionship between product performance and resource alloca- 
tion. Thus, in a network market, the direct effect of stand- 
alone product performance on resource allocation may be 
insignificant. We posit that this is due to mediation by the 
strength of the networks, and our findings support this. Of 
the ten stand-alone product performance attributes we mea- 
sure, Unix outperforms NT on eight, suggesting that respon- 
dents believe it to be the superior operating system. If prod- 
uct performance were the driving determinant of product 
adoption, we would expect Unix to be the favored choice. 
However, on average in 1998, 61% of the budget of each 
respondent was spent on NT. In addition, those who rated 
Unix's product performance superior, but perceived NT's 
networks stronger, were more than twice as likely to allocate 
resources to NT, compared with Unix. Why would this be 
the case? Our model suggests that it is due to the relative 
strength of the networks associated with NT and the net- 
works' mediation of the effect of product performance on 
resource allocation. Of the 13 network characteristics we 
measure, NT outperforms Unix on eight of these measures, 
and Unix's networks rate stronger than NT's in only two 
cases. Thus, we present this as empirical evidence that in a 
market in which networks matter, the relative strength of the 
networks presents an important influence on purchase deci- 
sions and thus presents a mechanism by which a less pre- 
ferred technology can gain market share. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This research makes several key contributions to the mar- 
keting literature. First, this article contributes a model of 
adoption in a network market that builds on our understand- 
ing of diffusion, adoption, and resource allocation. It 
extends our knowledge on what networks exist and influ- 
ence adoption decisions as well as how those networks can 
be characterized. We contribute to the work in market-based 
assets and the "whole product" concept (Lambkin and Day 
1989; McIntyre 1988; Moore 1999; Srivastava, Shervani, 
and Fahey 1998, 1999) by explicating the assets that exist in 
the marketplace and complete a technological product offer- 
ing. We extend research in diffusion (e.g., Bass 1969; Maha- 
jan, Muller, and Bass 1990) by suggesting that the coeffi- 
cient of imitation, appropriate for aggregate models, can be 
augmented with other network characteristics when data 
from consumers can be gathered, which provides a richer 
characterization of the installed base (user network) and the 
way it influences consumer decisions. Furthermore, we 
show that both the complements and the producer networks 
can be as relevant as the user network in determining 
resource allocation. Most important, we show that when 
considered in one model, all three networks play a signifi- 
cant role in determining how consumers allocate their 
resources. Each of these three networks can be characterized 
by its current size, expectations of its future size, its com- 
patibility and accessibility to the potential adopter, and the 
quality of its members. These characteristics determine the 
strength of the network. 
We examine not first-time adoption or trial but rather 
intraorganizational adoption or the continued commitment 
of resources to a product or platform. The degree of 
intraorganizational adoption is more critical in determining 
the success of a product, because most sales of technologi- 
cal products are additional purchases by firms that have 
already tried the product (Kim and Srivastava 1998). There- 
fore, we examine continued resource allocation of two com- 
peting products. 
Second, we advance the field's understanding beyond 
that which was previously analytically modeled to that 
which is empirically validated, providing future researchers 
with an expanded model of how purchase decisions are 
made in network markets (Arthur 1989; John, Weiss, and 
Dutta 1999). Our study further defines and provides an 
empirical examination of market-base assets (Srivastava, 
Shervani, and Fahey 1998, 1999) and demonstrates the 
influence of these firm-external assets on purchase deci- 
sions. In addition, this article contributes an empirical vali- 
dation of the Integrated Networks model as well as the pre- 
ceding model of network externalities. Prior to this study, a 
direct measure of consumers' perceptions of network exter- 
nalities has not been undertaken, and analytical models have 
dominated (John, Weiss, and Dutta 1999). The empirical 
research previously undertaken relies primarily on aggregate 
data (e.g., Economides and Himmelberg 1995; Gandal, 
Kende, and Rob 2000); however, we directly measure con- 
sumers' perceptions of the characteristics of the three net- 
works and their relationship with resource allocation deci- 
sions. This complements prior analytical and aggregate 
work and also extends that work significantly. 
Third, in demonstrating that the networks mediate the 
relationship between the product performance and resource 
allocation, we provide evidence that with strong networks, a 
less-preferred technology may gain increased market share 
through the value delivered by its networks (Arthur 1989; 
Liebowitz and Margolis 1995; Valente 1995). Again, this 
further validates the criticality of managing the market- 
based assets in a network market. 
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Managerial Implications 
Managers in network markets can draw many lessons from 
the Integrated Networks model. First, the framework 
encourages managers to develop not just the user network 
(as would network externalities or diffusion), but the com- 
plements and producer networks as well. All three types of 
market-based assets aid in creating a whole product, allow- 
ing the firm to "cross the chasm" by attracting early major- 
ity adopters crucial to product success. The Sega Dreamcast 
game system, introduced in 1998 and widely regarded as 
superior to other gaming consoles at the time, failed to reach 
expected sales levels because game developers (Sega 
included) were unable to introduce enough games (comple- 
ments) simultaneously with the console. The market quickly 
tipped away from Sega Dreamcast, and Sega ultimately 
exited the market. One reason often cited for the VHS's tri- 
umph over the Sony Betamax was Matsushita's willingness 
to grow the producer network by licensing its design, 
whereas Sony chose to remain a sole provider. Again, the 
market tipped toward the product with the stronger network. 
Second, the recognition of network strength as the 
underlying construct composed of multiple first-order con- 
structs expands the strategic levers available to managers in 
network markets. Instead of solely increasing the size of the 
networks or influencing expectations regarding the future 
size of the networks as might be suggested by the original 
network externalities theory, the Integrated Networks model 
encourages managers to develop the networks on several 
dimensions, seeking users, complements, and producers that 
are compatible with the adopter, accessible to the adopter, 
and of the appropriate quality to provide utility to the 
adopter. For example, the diffusion of high-definition televi- 
sion has largely depended on the complements network, not 
only broadcast programming as is commonly cited but also 
other forms of digital input such as DVD players (Heller 
2001). 
Such implications apply to both entrant and incumbent 
firms. In our study, Windows NT (the workstation operating 
system entrant) had not surpassed the incumbent (Unix) on 
stand-alone technological performance. Nevertheless, our 
findings show that IT professionals intended to allocate a 
larger portion of their resources to NT rather than Unix, 
because of the strong networks Microsoft developed around 
NT. Thus, when an entrant's product is able to perform ade- 
quately (we do not mean to suggest that an unusable prod- 
uct can succeed solely through its networks), its managers 
should quickly address the market-based assets or networks 
associated with the product. 
Likewise, an incumbent must protect its networks from 
encroachment by entrants. Our study reinforces the notion 
that having a superior product is not enough. Long-dominant 
game console makers Sony and Nintendo have worked dili- 
gently to strengthen their networks in the face of Microsoft's 
entrance to their network market with the X-Box. Microsoft's 
action in the desktop market demonstrates its own belief that 
its networks are crucial. In 1995, Microsoft was the incum- 
bent in the desktop operating systems market, and it fought 
fiercely to protect its networks against Netscape's browser, 
which threatened to break the applications barrier to entry 
Microsoft constructed. Microsoft ensured a growing user net- 
work (consumers) by wielding its power with one of its key 
complements, computer manufacturers. By encouraging the 
manufacturers to put Internet Explorer (and only Internet 
Explorer) on the desktop and by bundling Internet Explorer 
with Windows, Microsoft significantly degraded consumers' 
accessibility to desktop-entrant Netscape. Microsoft's will- 
ingness to use legally risky tactics shows the criticality it 
attached to maintaining its strong networks. 
Limitations 
The results of the study must be considered together with its 
limitations. We conducted the study using single respon- 
dents from a sample of large firms regarding resource allo- 
cation in a single product market. For generalizable conclu- 
sions, we would need to establish the effects across a 
broader cross-section of goods and services. To assess the 
generalizability of the scales, we would need to establish 
their reliability as well as their convergent and discriminant 
validity in multiple contexts. Thus, we do not have evidence 
that our findings are not context specific. 
Our empirical setting, operating systems, has strong net- 
work effects relative to other markets. Operating systems 
alone provide critical functions but rely heavily on comple- 
ments such as application software, hardware, and user 
skills to be truly useful. Furthermore, one of the main func- 
tions of computing today is connectivity, and therefore the 
importance of users owning compatible systems may be 
exaggerated in this context when compared with markets 
that are further removed from the concept of a physical net- 
work providing the infrastructure links between network 
elements. When applying the results of this study to other 
contexts, the importance of networks in each context should 
be considered. 
It is idiosyncratic that there is only one producer of one 
of the technologies (Microsoft's Windows NT) and multiple 
product producers of the other (e.g., IBM's AIX, Sun's 
Solaris, Hewlett-Packard's HP-UX) in this market. There- 
fore, we did not measure the current size or the expectations 
of future size of the producer network. This may also limit 
the generalizability of the results. 
Further Research 
Economists have assumed that the growth of the user net- 
work precedes that of the complements and producer net- 
works, but strategic maneuvering by firms to attract com- 
plements (such as electronic games) prior to focal product 
availability suggests otherwise. Future studies might inves- 
tigate the interdependencies among the networks and the 
influence each network has on the development of the other 
two. 
Contingency variables are likely to delineate various 
competitive scenarios within network markets. What com- 
petitive environments make particular aspects of the Inte- 
grated Networks model more critical tfor success, more 
amenable to favorable strategic manipulation, or more open 
to threats by other firms? The extensions the Integrated Net- 
works model makes to network externality research will 
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shed light on the strategic levers that can be used by man- 
agers of firms sponsoring a particular technology. The use of 
the Integrated Networks model in other empirical contexts 
in which networks are likely to be more and less important 
will validate the axes along which the model provides mean- 
ingful insights. 
Finally, research conducted from the perspective of the 
technology-sponsoring firm would also provide insight into 
network markets and standards battles. Combined with the 
Integrated Networks model, investigations of technological 
bandwagons, standard-setting alliances, and standards com- 
mittees provide a starting point for such research. The share- 
holder value created by such market-based assets could then 
be more accurately assessed. Likewise, research on comple- 
mentary product strategies (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Sen- 
gupta 1998; Teece 1986) and licensing activities (Conner 
1995; Farrell and Gallini 1988; Kotabe, Sahay, and Aulakh 
1996) would provide insight into how a firm might proceed in 
attempting to develop networks, increase adoption and 
resource allocation, and make its product the de facto standard. 
As researchers continue to examine network business 
markets, and as the question of dominant inferior technolo- 
gies continues to be raised, the Integrated Networks model 
should aid in future empirical work and in future theory 
building. Our work complements research on market-based 
assets (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998), the value net 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996), and the value web 
(Cartwright and Oliver 2000), emphasizing a whole product 
or product ecosystem perspective to providing the customer 
with a complete solution (Lambkin and Day 1989; Moore 
1999). Network markets represent a significant portion of 
the world's economy, and understanding such markets 
becomes more critical to managing that segment of the 
economy. As firms continue to address adoption issues in 
network markets, this expanded view of the forces behind 
these markets should aid in the decision-making process. 
Appendix A 
Network Final Scale Items, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Loadings, and Cronbach's Alpha 
Coefficient* 
User Network 
Current Size: Difference Score a = .80, Unix a = 
.80, NT a = .77 
.79** Today, this operating system has the largest 
installed base of users in my specific decision 
area. 
.82 This operating system has a sizable market share 
today in my specific decision area. 
.73 The larger market share worldwide in my specific 
decision area is currently held by this operating 
system. 
Expectations of Future Size: Difference Score a = 
.93, Unix a = .93, NT a = .93 
.87 In the future, I expect this operating system to 
have the most users in my specific decision area. 
.84 In the future, this operating system will probably 
have a larger market share than any of its 
competitors in my specific decision area. 
.89 Over the next few years, I think more and more IT 
professionals in my specific decision area will 
choose this operating system for their use. 
.84 In the future, this operating system is likely to 
attract many more users in my specific decision 
area. 
.82 Over the next few years, I expect the installed 
base for this operating system to grow rapidly in 
my specific decision area. 
Compatibility Difference Score a = .89, Unix a = 
.91, NT a = .89 
.90 People in our firm currently use this operating 
system. 
.92 People in our firm, within my specific decision 
area, currently use this operating system. 
.85 Outside of my specific decision area, there are 
many people in our firm with whom I need to be 
compatible, who use this operating system. 
Accessibility. Difference Score a = .66, Unix a = 
.87, NT a = .87 
.81 Currently, it is easy to find members of this 
operating system's installed base to help me make 
decisions regarding this operating system. 
.85 It is easy to contact members of the installed base 
who have adopted this operating system. 
.87 If I need information about this operating system, I 
can readily find a member of the installed base to 
provide that information. 
Quality. Difference Score 
a = .88, Unix a = .92, 
NT  = .89 
.89 Today, IT professionals in my specific decision 
area who are "in the know" about technology use 
this operating system. 
.78 IT professionals who currently know a lot about 
operating systems have chosen this operating 
system. 
.85 IT professionals in my specific decision area 
whose opinions I respect use this operating 
system. 
.81 IT professionals in firms that lead our industry 
today have adopted this operating system. 
Complements Network 
Current Size: Difference Score a = .85, Unix a = 
.89, NT a = .87 
.88 Today, there is a great deal of hardware, software, 
skills, and support in my decision area available 
for this operating system. 
.79 At this time, this operating system has the largest 
amount of hardware, software, skills, and support 
available for my specific decision. 
.83 Today, most hardware, software, skills, and 
support for my specific decision area are 
compatible with this operating system. 
Expectations of Future Size: Difference Score a = 
.86, Unix a = .90, NT a = .90 
.85 Over the next few years, more and more 
hardware, software, skills, and support for my 
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Appendix A 
Continued 
specific decision area will be compatible with this 
operating system. 
.89 In the future, I believe that this operating system 
will have more hardware, software, skills and 
support han its competitors. 
.86 Over the next few years, I expect the amount of 
hardware, software, skills, and support o grow 
very rapidly for this operating system. 
Compatibility Difference Score a = .71, Unix a = 
.83, NT a = .78 
.73 The hardware, software, skills, and support 
needed for backward compatibility in my specific 
decision are compatible with this operating system 
today. 
.83 Most hardware, software, skills, and support that I 
need for my specific decision today are available 
for this operating system. 
.71 Hardware, software, skills, and support that my 
area currently needs in order to interact with other 
units in my firm are available for this operating 
system. 
Accessibility Difference Score a = .77, Unix a = 
.86, NT a = .85 
.78 The hardware, software, skills, and support for this 
operating system are well distributed or widely 
available. 
.71 I have seen many ads for hardware, software, 
skills, and support for this operating system 
related to my specific decision. 
.85 Today, it is easy to get help with hardware, 
software, skills, and support for this operating 
system. 
Quality Difference Score a = .78, Unix a = .86, 
NT a = .82 
.79 The hardware, software, skills, and support for this 
operating system in my specific decision area are 
generally of very high quality. 
.84 The hardware, software, skills, and support 
available for this operating system are highly 
reliable. 
.76 The hardware, software, skills, and support 
available for this operating system are the most 
technologically advanced for my specific decision 
area. 
Producer Network 
Compatibility Difference Score a = .77, Unix a = 
.90, NT a = .77 
.80 I already have a good working relationship with 
the firm(s) that develop this operating system. 
.76 I have service contracts with the firm(s) that 
develop this operating system. 
.78 I already have procedures established for 
purchasing from the firm(s) that develop this 
operating system. 
Accessibility Difference Score a = .71, Unix a = 
.84, NT a = .86 
.86 I am currently familiar with the firm(s) that develop 
this operating system. 
.54 I have seen many ads by the firm(s) that develop 
this operating system. 
.58 Today, this operating system is widely distributed 
and is easy to obtain. 
Quality: Difference Score a = .84, Unix a = .91, 
NT a = .86 
.88 Firms whose quality I respect develop this 
operating system. 
.77 The firm(s) that develop this operating system 
has/have a reputation for knowing a great deal 
about operating systems. 
.85 Firms that I trust develop this operating system. 
*"Difference Score" signifies the coefficient alpha of the difference scores (computed as recommended by Peter, Churchill, and Brown 1993), 
"Unix" signifies the coefficient alpha of the Unix measures, "NT" signifies the coefficient alpha of the NT measures. 
**This column contains CFA loadings, all significant at the p < .05 level. 
Appendix B 
Control Variable Final Scale Items, CFA Loadings, and Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient 
Decision-Making Variables: X213 = 19.53; NFI = .99; CFI = 
.99 
Risk Aversion: a = .70 
.37* My firm is the type of firm that often tries new IT 
products at least once. 
.65 When my firm buys IT prod-ucts, it buys only well- 
established brands. (R) 
.76 My firm is cautious in trying new/different IT 
products. (R) 
.68 My firm does not like to buy something unknown 
where there is the risk of making a mistake. (R) 
Innovativeness: a = .82 
.69 When existing rules and procedures are not 
adequate to make an IT decision, instructions are 
requested from senior IT management. 
.81 When problems arise in the technology selection 
process, the decision maker goes to senior IT 
management for an answer. 
.84 When an unusual situation is encountered in the 
IT decision-making process, senior IT 
management is consulted before moving forward. 
Cost Variables: X224 = 86.39; NFI = .92; CFI = .94 
Concern for Compatibility a = .68 
.56 When my firm considers which operating system 
to purchase, compatibility with our existing 
systems is not an issue. 
.55 Technically speaking, we are concerned about 
how compatible this operating system will be with 
the other computer-based systems in our firm. 
.87 System compatibility is not an issue as we 
consider adopting an operating system. 
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Appendix B 
Continued 
Cost of Heterogeneity. a = .89 
.77 It is much less expensive for us to use only one 
operating system, either Windows NT or Unix, 
than to use both. 
.93 Our installation costs are much lower if we 
standardize on a single operating system. 
.88 Our training costs are much lower if we have only 
one operating system in our decision environment. 
Financial Switching Costs: a = .66 
.55 Switching to a new operating system would 
require us to spend a great deal of money on new 
hardware. 
.69 Switching to a new operating system would 
require us to spend a great deal of money on new 
application software. 
.65 Switching to a new operating system would be 
very expensive in terms of restructuring our 
system maintenance and our help desk facilities. 
Relative Total Cost of Ownership-Formative Scale 
End points of "not at all expensive" and "very expensive" 
*The street price of the operating system itself and the 
hardware on which it runs, per seat. 
*The cost of installing the operating system and its 
associated hardware in your decision environment. 
*The cost of maintaining the operating system and its 
associated hardware (e.g., system administration, 
system back-ups, operating system upgrades, new 
application installation, and upgrades). 
*The cost of providing a "help desk" to the users in your 
decision environment. 
*The cost of training users in your decision environment. 
*This column contains CFA loadings, all significant at the p < .05 level. 
Notes: (R) = reverse scored. 
Appendix C 
First- and Second-Order Factor Fit Indices and Comparison of X2 
User Complements Producer 
Network Network Network 
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 
CFI .96 .95 .95 .95 .97 .97 
NFI .92 .92 .92 .93 .95 .95 
Incremental fit index .96 .95 .95 .95 .97 .97 
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI) .89 .88 .90 .89 .96 .96 
Adjusted GFI .85 .85 .86 .84 .92 .92 
Parsimony GFI .65 .67 .60 .63 .51 .51 
Parsimony NFI .76 .78 .70 .73 .63 .63 
Root mean square residual .12 .15 .09 .08 .08 .08 
d.f. 125 130 80 85 24 24 
X2 266.78 293.08 191.79 230.32 51.81 51.81 
Change in X2 26.30* 38.53* 0 
Change in d.f. 5 5 0 
*p < .05. 
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